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CASE COMMENTS
The change in the constitution has provided for recovery in cases
where there has been no taking but where the public improvement
substantially damages property. 4 This does not mean that noise
alone would be considered as a proper element of damage in West
Virginia. However, if substantial damage can be shown, noise might
be considered as one of many elements present which reduce the
market value of the land, even in the absence of a taking.
Allowing recovery for traffic noise in one case does not warrant
the conclusion that noise should be considered as an element in
all condemnation cases where noise is present. Refusing to con-
sider noise as an element would be proper in many cases, but if noise
directly affects the market value of the land when grouped with
other elements, then it should be considered as a proper element of
damage.
Charles Quincey Gage
Estate Tax-Payment of Premiums on a Transferred Life
Insurance Policy in Contemplation of Death
In May, 1957, decedent caused a life insurance policy to be
issued on his life in the face amount of $50,000, his wife to be
beneficiary and life owner. The decedent did not, at any time,
have the right to exercise any options or privileges in the policy or
to agree with the insurance company to any change in, ammend-
ment to, or cancellation of the policy. Decedent died on March
25, 1958, and his wife did not include the proceeds of the policy
in his gross estate for federal tax purposes. The Commissioner
assessed a deficiency; the widow paid and sued for a refund, alleg-
or damaging property. The Tidewater Ry. case was one of the first cases in
Virginia interpreting the amendment.24 Cline v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 69 W. Va. 436, 71 S.E. 705 (1911).
There are procedural difficulties attendant when trying to sue the state. The
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35 provides: "The State of West Virginia shall
never be made defendant in any court of law or equity. . . ." However,
damages may be caused by the construction of a highway, and the State
Road Commissioner may fail to assess the damages and provide compensation.
In such a case, instead of suing the state, a mandamus proceeding may be
brought to force the commissioner to access damages, even in the absence of
an actual taking. State ex rel. French v. Sawyers, 147 W. Va. 619, 129
S.E.2d 831 (1963). Thus, the mandamus proceeding will reach the desired
result. In a mandamus proceeding the petitioner need not show that he has
been damaged or the amount of damage; but he must show that there is a
reasonable cause for these questions to be resolved by a judge and jury.
State ex rel. Smeltzer v. Sawyers, 149 W. Va. 641, 142 S.E.2d 886 (1965).
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ing that the proceeds were not taxable. The court assumed that the
premiums paid on the policy were paid by the decedent. Held,
for the taxpayer. The court rejected Revenue Ruling 67-463 (which
held that a proportionate part of death proceeds attributable to the
premiums paid by the insured is includible in his gross estate under
section 2035) and said that only the amount of the premiums paid
by the decedent was taxable under section 2035 of the 1954 Code.
Gorman v. United States, 22 AFTR2d 1 147, 241 (E.D. Mich.
1968).
It appears that Congress and the Treasury have had a difficult
time, over the years, in formulating an acceptable test to determine
whether or not the proceeds of a life insurance policy are includible
in the insured's estate.' The 1918 Revenue Act used the premium
payment test to decide whether the proceeds of a decedent's policy
payable to a beneficiary other than an executor, should be taxed
as part of the decedent's estate. Under this act it was held that
the proceeds upon the insured's death should be included in his
estate only to the extent that he paid, either directly or indirectly,
the premiums or other considerations for the policies.2
At different times the Treasury Department has taken the posi-
tion that both the payment of premium test and the incidents of
ownership test were to be used to determine the taxability of
insurance proceeds, that the possession of incidents of ownership
was the sole test of taxability and that payment of premiums was
the sole test of taxability.3
The last major revision of the Internal Revenue Code in 1954
made the incidents of ownership test the sole test to determine the
taxability of deceased's insurance proceeds payable to others than
the executor of the estate.4 Therefore, it is important to understand
what are to be interpreted as incidents of ownership. The following,
among others, have been held to be incidents of ownership of an
insurance policy: the right to change the beneficiary;5 the right
I Paul, Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax, 52 HAgv. L. Rv.
1037 (1939). For a history of the Code provisions concerning insurance
policies see 111-2d BNA, TAx MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIos, LIF INSURANCE
A-i (1967).
2 Act of Feb. 4, 1919, ch. 18 § 4, 40 Stat. 1096. See Lang v. Commis-
sioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938).
3 Cain v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 1133 (1941). See also, 28 AM. JUR.
Inheritance, Estate, and Gift Taxes § 254 (1959).
4 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2042(2).
5 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042 (1958). See Chase Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner,
278 U.S. 327 (1929).
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to obtain the cash surrender or loan value without the consent of
the beneficiary;6 and the right to surrender or to cancel the policy.'
Although the Internal Revenue Code expressly taxes proceeds
from life insurance in only one section,' it is possible that the pro-
ceeds can come within another section.9 More specifically, section
2035, concerning transactions in contemplation of death, can often
be applied to life insurance proceeds."0 Relying on section 2035,
the Internal Revenue Service has taken the position in Revenue
Ruling 67-463" that premium payments made by the deceased
within three years of his death are transfers of an interest in the
policy, and a pro rata portion of the proceeds should be included in
his estate, even though he had transferred the incidents of owner-
ship in the policy more than three years before his death. 2
The Gorman case explicitly rejected Revenue Ruling 67-4633
in holding that the IRS was attempting, through administrative tac-
tics, to incorporate the payment of premium test, even though it
6 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042 (1958). See Walker v. United States, 83 F.2d
103 (Sth Cir. 1936).7 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042 (1958). See Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247
(1st Cir. 1945); Ballard v. Helburn, 9 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. Ky. 1933),
afj'd per curiam, 85 F.2d 613 (6th Cir. 1936).
8 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2042.
9 May Billings, 35 B.T.A. 1147 (1937); Estate of F. A. Vanderlip, 3 T.C.
358 (1944).
'0 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2035. The regulation states that any trans-
fer of a life insurance policy in contemplation of death will make the pro-
ceeds includible in the gross estate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(c) (1958). Section
2035 provides that the gross estate will include property transferred in con-
templation of death during the three years prior to death. This section also
states that transfers made within a period of three years of decedent's death
shall be deemed to be made in contemplation of death unless shown to the
contrary.11 1967 INT. REv. BULL. No. 52, at 15.
121d. The Revenue Ruling cited Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247
(1st. Cir. 1945) as one of the authorities for its conclusion. In this case,
decedent transferred a policy to his wife and died two years later after she
had paid two premiums. The court held that even though assets transferred
in contemplation of death must be taxed at their value at the date of death,
the portion of the proceeds attributable to the two premiums paid by the
wife should not be included in the estate. The Service also cited Chase Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929), as holding that the word
"transfer" in the predecessor of INr. REv. CODE of 1954, §2035 must include
the transfer of property procured through expenditures by the decedent with
the purpose, effected at his death, of having it pass to another.
3z 1967 INT. REv. BULL. No. 52, at 15. The Gorman case noted that
the Liebmann case should not be regarded as authority for the Service's
position in the revenue ruling, 1967 Irr. REv. BULL. No. 52, at 15. Liebmann
relied on section 302(g) of the 1926 Revenue Act to equate the payment
of premiums by the decedent's wife to an addition or improvement made by
her to the property transferred in an amount equal to a pro rata amount
of the proceeds. Section 302(g) and the regulations promulgated thereunder
use the payment of premium test, and since this test is not contained in the
19691
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had been specifically left out of the 1954 Code. The court stated that
it would "not legislate, nor shall the Service, in an area specifically
reserved to Congress."' 14 The court concluded that what is trans-
ferred when a premium is paid is only the dollar amount of the
premium.' 5
It should be noted that the Commissioner in Gorman did not
appear to concentrate on the point that the insured died only one
year after the policy was taken out. It seems that the commissioner
could have argued that, although the insured never technically pos-
sessed any of the incidents of ownership, he, in substance, purchased
and subsequently transferred the policy to his wife. Since this pur-
chase was made within three years of his death, it could have rea-
sonably been argued that this amounted to a transfer of the policy
itself under section 2035 of the Code.
Gorman has again opened the question of what should be in-
cluded in an insured's estate under section 2035 when he possesses
no incidents of ownership in a policy on his life, but has continued
to pay the premiums on the policy. The case rejected the Service's
attempt to apply the premium payment test, which was left out of
the 1954 Code and held that only the amount of premiums paid by
the insured within three years of his death are to be included in his
estate.
E. Lee Schlaegel, Jr.
Gift Tax-Gift to Minor Qualifying for Section 2503 Exclusion
In 1962 the Crummeys established an irrevocable trust for the
benefit of their four children, three of whom were minors. The
terms of the trust provided for accumulation of the trust income,
except for distributions to a needy beneficiary, until each minor
reached the age of twenty-one. From age twenty-one to thirty-five
all income was to be distributed to the beneficiaries and from age
thirty-five on, the trustee was to control distribution of both in-
1954 Code, the Liebmann case is not authority for the proposition that pay-
ment of premiums transfers an interest in the policy. The Gorman case also
holds that the Chase Nat'l Bank case "did not demonstrate that transfer
occurs with the payment of each premium, in fact it was not even considered
by the court. . . .The court never considered the relationship of premiums
with proceeds." Gorman v. United States, 22 AFTR2d f" 147,241, at 147,990.42
(E.D. Mich. 1968).
14Gorman v. United States, 22 AFTR2d ii 147,241, at 147,990.42
(E.D. Mich. 1968).
15 Id. at 147,990.46-47.
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